JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY HYDERABAD

UNIT - I

Introduction: Game Theory, Games and Solutions Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium, Rational Behavior, The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations, Bounded Rationality Terminology and Notation Nash Equilibrium- Strategic Games, Nash Equilibrium Examples Existence of a Nash Equilibrium, Strictly Competitive Games, Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect Information

UNIT - II

Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium -Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Correlated Equilibrium Evolutionary Equilibrium Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions-Rationalizability Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions, Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions

UNIT - III

Knowledge and Equilibrium -A Model of Knowledge Common Knowledge, Can People Agree to Disagree? , Knowledge and Solution Concepts, The Electronic Mail Game

UNIT - IV

Extensive Games with Perfect Information -Extensive Games with Perfect Information Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game The Interpretation of a Strategy , Two Notable Finite Horizon Games , Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies Bargaining Games -Bargaining and Game Theory , A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Variations and Extensions

UNIT - V

Repeated Games - The Basic Idea Infinitely Repeated Games vs.\ Finitely Repeated Games Infinitely Repeated Games: Definitions Strategies as Machines Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems Punishing for a Limited Length of Time: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion Punishing the Punisher: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Overtaking Criterion Rewarding Players Who Punish: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Discounting Criterion The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Discounting Criterion Finitely Repeated Game

TEXT BOOKS:

• 1. M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A course in Game Theory, MIT Press
• 2. Roger Myerson, Game Theory, Harvard University Press
• 3. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press

REFERENCES:

• 1. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
• 2. R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, New York: John Wiley and Sons.,
• 3. G. Owen, Game Theory, (Second Edition), New York: Academic Press,